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We study the interaction between two regulated ﬁrms: a downstream provider
of services to ﬁnal consumers and the upstream supplier of the inputs necessary
for the provision of the services. While the analytical set-up is closely modelled
on the scheme chosen in the UK for the regulation of the railway network and
therefore it can yield immediate practical interpretations for that case, it also
has broader lessons for the regulatory design of the contractual relationship
between upstream and downstream ﬁrms in regulated industries.
The deﬁning regulatory feature of the UK regulatory system1 in place for
the railway network is the separation between the Train Operating Company
(TOC) and the ROlling Stock COmpany (ROSCO). In a nutshell, the national
network is divided into several geographical franchises,2 essentially separate
from an operational viewpoint. In each of these areas, one TOC provides
the rail services to passengers, and leases its rolling stock from one of the
three ROSCOs which are allowed to operate. Each franchise is assigned to
a TOC by the Department for Transport, following a competitive process.3
The aspect of the process relevant to our paper is that, to be allowed to bid,
a TOC must enter a broad agreement for the supply of the necessary rolling
stock with one of the ROSCOs. Once a TOC is awarded the franchise for
one area, it is essentially constrained to lease the rolling stock it needs from
the speciﬁc ROSCO it had chosen before bidding. Following the award of the
franchise, the original broad agreement between them can be “ﬁnalised”, or,
in the economic jargon, re-negotiated. We pick up the thread from here, in a
model which studies the re-negotiation between the two parties and the eﬀects
of the agreement they reach. In line with the UK regulatory mechanism, we
rule out the possibility for the TOC to switch to a diﬀerent ROSCO.
The UK regulatory mechanism is intended to enhance competition. This
can happen through three channels. First, the well understood competitive
eﬀect of bidding for the award of the franchise is strengthened, in the UK
1An exhaustive and up-to-date description of the regulatory and institutional set-up of
the UK railway industry is in Oﬃce of Rail Regulation (2007); see Newbery (1997) for an
overview of the utilities’ reform in the UK.
2Currently, there are 19 franchised operators, the Department for Transport is the award-
ing body for all of them except three. Additionally, there are 6 non-franchised operators. A
full list of the train operators in the UK can be found at: www.atoc-comms.org/franchised-
passenger-services.php.
3See ORR (2007) for details on the franchise process. For a general overview on ORR’s
role after the implementation of the Railways Act 2005, see Department for Transport (2007).
1mechanism, by the fact that participation in the bidding does not require
a TOC to incur the hefty sunk entry cost constituted by the acquisition of
suitable rolling stock: this increases the number of potential bidders. Secondly,
precisely because the incumbent does not own the rolling stock, it is feasible
to award the franchise for a period shorter than the rolling stock’s economic
life,4 ensuring that the threat to withdraw the franchise is credible and keeps
the incumbent on its toes. Finally, preventing the TOCs from owning rolling
stock makes it easier to transfer rolling material from one area to another,
which may be required following changes in the geographical distribution of
demand.
The ease with which rolling stock can be switched to a diﬀerent franchise
is a key determinant of the eﬃcacy of the latter two channels in enhancing
competition, and therefore we build a model that centres around it. Many
technical factors inﬂuence how easily rolling stock can be switched. The type
of the train’s power supply, its maximum speed, the position its doors, its size,
clearance and conﬁguration (a train designed with a ﬂat rural region in mind,
with few large stations, may be totally unsuited to a mountainous area with
many smaller stations).5 If some of these technical factors, such as the gauge,
are eﬀectively ﬁxed, most can instead be typically varied by whoever designs
the train. In other words, the speciﬁcity of the rolling stock, which aﬀects how
easy it is to deploy a train to an area diﬀerent from the one it was designed
for, is chosen to balance technical considerations with economic and strategic
reasons. Our model studies the trade-oﬀ between increasing speciﬁcity, that is
d e s i g n i n gt h er o l l i n gs t o c ki naw a ys u i t e dt ot h eg e o g r a p h i c a la r e at ow h i c h
it is destined, and decreasing speciﬁcity, that is increasing ﬂexibility by opting
for a design which makes it easier to operate the rolling stock in a diﬀerent
area. We argue here that the regulatory system itself aﬀects the choice of the
l e v e lo fs p e c i ﬁcity of the rolling stock, and, through it, the quality and cost of
the train services.
A suitable conceptual framework to study the role played by the regula-
tory regime on the interaction between TOC and ROSCO is provided by the
theoretical literature on incomplete contracts.6 This is based on the idea that
4“Engines and carriages have a working life far longer than the length of a passenger
franchise contract, and are therefore not owned by the companies themselves but by private
sector leasing companies.”, UK Department for Transport (2004).
5See SRA (2004) for further details about the degree of standardisation in the rail network
in the UK.
6Hart and Holmstrom (1987) provided an early review, and Tirole (1999) an evaluation.
2in many long term relationships, a party who can make a relation speciﬁci n -
vestment which reduces the costs and/or increases the beneﬁts of the other
party, may refrain from doing so if it is unable to reap a share of the beneﬁt
of its investment. This happens because contracts are incomplete, in the sense
that it is impossible (or prohibitively costly) to specify the obligation of each
party in every conceivable eventuality in suﬃcient detail to allow a third party,
called to enforce the contract in the event of a dispute, to determine whether
a breach has occurred or not.7 We cast the choice of the train speciﬁcity s as a
relation speciﬁc investment by the ROSCO. The investment in our paper has
however a conceptually diﬀerent nature from the investment in the incomplete
contracts literature. The cost of speciﬁcity is not given by the production
process, as there is no reason to suppose that building a “ﬂexible” train is in
principle more or less costly than building a highly speciﬁc train, but instead
by the lower net revenues which can be obtained using the rolling stock in a dif-
ferent region. This is the nature of speciﬁcity: more speciﬁcity helps produce
a high quality service on the “right line”, but it decreases the quality — and
hence the market value — of a train’s services on the “wrong line”.8 This has
the subtle implication that the cost of the “investment in speciﬁcity” depends
on the regulatory mechanism. The barriers to writing a complete contract
are determined by the UK regulatory regime, which imposes the separation
between TOC and ROSCO. In this sense, the degree of separation between
the TOC and the ROSCO must itself be seen a policy instrument, and the
paper provides a conceptual framework to analyse its role and its eﬀects. Our
set-up, therefore, diﬀers from the standard incomplete contract literature: the
feasible contracts are not exogenously given by technological and informational
constraints, and so it makes sense to compare the “separation” regime chosen
for the UK rail network, akin to contract incompleteness between the TOC
and the ROSCO, with the “integration” regime of complete contracts, typical
of most other EU countries.9 We compare two cases. In the ﬁrst, complete
7The typical example is a clause specifying that quality must be “good” or “adequate”: in
the event of a dispute, even though both parties may come to the same (private) judgement
as to whether quality is “adequate”, an enforcer, such as a court or an arbitrator, cannot.
8See Ménard and Yvrande-Billon (2005) for a similar point of view: “The non-
redeployability is critical here. Discrepancies between contract duration and the physical
lifetime of equipment exist in many leasing industries (e.g. car and truck rental), but it is
n op r o b l e ma sl o n ga se q u i p m e n th a sa l t e r n a t i v eu s e r s ” .
9The regulatory regime is however clearly under strain, to the point that the Oﬃce of
Rail Regulation has recently referred to the competition authority about the prevention of
3contracts can be written and the TOC and the ROSCO agree both on transfer
prices and on the design of the train. In the second, the parties are not per-
mitted to write complete long term contracts which specify in suﬃcient detail
the characteristics of the rolling material to be supplied by the ROSCO to the
TOC, and they can only agree on transfer prices, while the degree of speciﬁcity
of the rolling stock is chosen by the ROSCO on its own.
We ﬁnd that both the degree of speciﬁcity and the investment in qual-
i t yi n c r e a s ew i t hi n t e g r a t i o n ,i nl i n ew i t hm o s to ft h el i t e r a t u r e . 10 The fact
that speciﬁcity and quality increase with integration does not however neces-
sarily imply that socially a fully integrated structure should be preferable, as
suggested, among others, by Ménard and Yvrande-Billon (2005) and Preston
(2002). Indeed, our model shows that there can be over-investment in spe-
ciﬁca s s e t sa n dexcessive quality of service. Too much speciﬁcity may mean
too little competition as the TOC and the ROSCO become too closely locked
together and sheltered from competition for the franchise: the technological
beneﬁt of speciﬁcity is traded oﬀ the lack of ﬂexibility and the anticompetitive
eﬀect of highly specialised rolling stock. This trade-oﬀ implies that a case by
case analysis is in principle necessary to evaluate the best regulatory design.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the model: demand,
technology and the possible vertical structures in 2.1, and the bargaining mech-
anism in 2.2. The temporal sequence of events and decisions is summarised in
Section 2.3. The policy analysis begins in Section 3 with the determination of
the ﬁrst best choice of speciﬁcity and eﬀort; these are compared in Section 5
with the equilibrium values in the two regulatory regimes derived in detail in
Section 4. The proofs of the more algebraic results are in the Appendix, which
is preceded by a brief conclusion.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Demand, technology, and regulatory regimes
We model the interaction between three agents: a regulator, the ﬁrm franchised
to supply rail transport services in a given region, train operating company, or
competition in the leasing market of rolling stock for franchised passenger services. In August
2008 the Competition Commission published its provisional ﬁndings and conﬁrmed that some
of the features of the rolling stock leasing market do indeed raise competition issues. See
ORR (2007) and Competition Commission (2008).
10See Kain (1998), Preston (2002), Crompton and Jupe (2003), Ménard and Yvrande-
Billon (2005).
4TOC in what follows, and the ﬁrm who has the expertise to design and supply
rolling stock, trains, and locomotives, ROSCO hereafter.
Consumers care about the quality of the service they receive.11 This is
denoted by q, and depends on the investment of the TOC, e ∈ [0,1] (a nor-
malisation),12 and on the realisation of a random variable, θ, with cumulative
distribution function Φ(θ),d e n s i t yφ(θ)=Φ0(θ), and support also normalised
to [0,1]. For concreteness, in the case of the railways, we can think of quality q
as given by the frequency of delayed trains, of the TOC’s investment, e,a si t s
provision and arrangements with regard to stand-by personnel and equipment,
and of the random element, θ, as the external exogenous factors that aﬀect
the provision of the train services. A high investment in stand-by provision by
the TOC reduces the negative impact, in terms of inconvenience and delays,
of a negative quality shock, such as a derailment.13 For simplicity we take an
additive speciﬁcation:
q = θ + e,( 1 )
and assume Φ(θ) to be uniform:
Φ(θ)=θ.( 2 )
Total revenues for rail service in the region are exogenously given by r>0.
Although quality can vary, revenues are independent of quality. This may
happen, for example, because the marginal consumer does not value quality,
even though the inframarginal consumers do, or because the price is regulated
and the regulator does not use mechanisms (such as the one studied by De
Fraja and Iozzi 2007) linking the allowed prices to the realised quality. This
simpliﬁcation helps us concentrate on the relationship between quality and
speciﬁcity, leaving aside the interaction between prices and quality.
Once the market structure is established, the regulator’s tool-kit is the im-
position of sanctions in the event of deterioration of the quality of the service.
We capture these sanctions with the simplifying assumption that the regulator
11Consumer surplus and total surplus are formalized in Section 3.
12Constraining e not to exceed 1 should be seen as capturing the idea that the cost of eﬀort
increases very rapidly when e approaches the technological maximum.
13θ are adverse weather shocks and freak accidents (such as the disaster caused by a SUV
becoming stuck on the railway and derailing the Newcastle-London high speed train near
Selby on 28/2/2001). e are the measures taken by companies to minimise the probability
of accidents and reducing the disruption caused by the weather (rather than attributing
delays and cancellations to leaves on the line or to the wrong “type of snow”, as famously
commented by a British Rail executive on 11/2/1991).
5chooses a minimum quality requirement qm ∈ [0,2] and the TOC’s franchise is
renewed if and only if its service quality is at least the minimum requirement,
q > qm. While most sanctions take the form of a ﬁne, the draconian pun-
ishment of withdrawing the licence was imposed on Connex South Eastern, a
train operator serving the South-East of England, in the second half of 2003
(National Audit Oﬃce, 2005).14 Given (1) and (2), the franchise is renewed
with probability
z =1− qm + e.( 3 )
By investing in quality enhancing activities e, the TOC can increase the quality
of the service and hence reduce the probability that the franchise is not renewed
by the regulator.
T h eR O S C O ’ si n v e s t m e n ti st h ed e g r e eo ft r a i ns p e c i ﬁcity, denoted by s.
Without loss of generality, we also normalise it to lie in [0,1].
Speciﬁcity has beneﬁts and costs. On the one hand, it reduces the cost
of providing quality, see (5) below. On the other hand, it makes it more
costly to transfer rolling material to a diﬀerent area: the more technically
and operationally suitable a train is to network A, the less suitable it is to
network B, and so we posit that the net revenue that can be obtained from
using it on network B is a decreasing function of the degree of speciﬁcity to
the original TOC. Formally, we denote by P (s),w i t hP0 (s) < 0, the unit net
revenues that can be obtained using a train of speciﬁcity s ∈ [0,1] destined to a
network diﬀerent from the one it was designed for. We also assume that P (s)
is concave in s: this would follow, for example, from the natural assumption





where k>0,a n dP0 > 1
2k, so that the revenue from an alternative network
are non-negative for every value of s. Note that there is in general no reason
to presume that speciﬁcity has also a technological cost: a train with, say
ﬁxed height entry steps (speciﬁc to the design of the stations where the TOC
operates) need not be more expensive to design and build than a train with
variable height entry steps, which can be transferred to rail networks with a
diﬀerent station design.
14An alternative, analytically identical, assumption is to posit some uncertainty on the
TOC’s part with regard to the regulator’s preference: the regulator is satisﬁed and renews
the franchise with a probability which is increasing in the quality level oﬀered by the TOC.
6The TOC and the ROSCO are private proﬁt maximising companies. As
explained above, the TOC’s revenues are exogenously given by r>0.T h e
TOC incurs two types of costs: the payments to the ROSCO for the use of its
rolling material, endogenously determined and discussed in details in the next
section, and the operating costs. The latter depend positively on the TOC’s
eﬀort for quality, since quality is costly, and negatively on the speciﬁcity of
the rolling material supplied by the ROSCO, since speciﬁcally designed trains
have lower running costs. We assume a linear speciﬁcation:
C(e,s)=c0 + cee − css, (5)
where c0,c e,c s > 0, and c0 >c s: the last ensures that operating costs are
positive for every possible combination of e and s. We deliberately set the
cross derivative,
∂2C(·)
∂e∂s at 0, to isolate the interaction between e and s which
is caused by the institutional set-up from any technological complementarity.
While exogenously given and independent of quality, demand is not ﬁxed.
It may be adversely aﬀected by an idiosyncratic shock, such as the closure of
a local employer or the opening of a new motorway, which aﬀects demand in
one area, but not in the others. Without shock, total revenues are r>0.T h e
negative shock reduces demand by a proportion u ∈ (0,1), and happens with
probability (1 − x).T h i s m a k e s α = u(1 − x) the relevant measure of the
TOC’s expected loss in the demand for the ﬁnal service.15 We eliminate the
uninteresting possibility that the train service is shut down by assuming that
the line is proﬁtable even if the demand shock occurs: ur − c0 >c e.
We assume that the areas of the network are symmetric, which imposes the
analytically convenient restriction that the unit proﬁt obtained from employing
a generic train (i.e., a train with s =0 ) in an alternative region is the same as
the unit proﬁt from using a generic train in the area considered:
P0 = r − c0 − ceeA,( 6 )
where eA is the investment in eﬀort chosen by the passengers service operator
in the alternative area. Clearly, ur − c0 >c e implies r − c0 − ce > 0,s ot h a t
15It is convenient to rule out aggregate uncertainty: the number of areas aﬀected by the
negative demand shock is known in advance, as is which franchisees will be able to lease
the additional trains from the areas where the adverse demand shock has occurred: the only
uncertainty is which areas will receive the adverse demand shock. The exact formalisation
of this simpliﬁcation would require distinguishing the analysis of TOCs who will be able to
lease some of their trains from the adversely aﬀected areas, from those who will not: this
would add heavy and unrewarding notation.
7the industry proﬁt from running generic trains is always positive across the
network.
The salient feature of the regulatory regime of the UK rail industry is the
separation between the ROSCO, the ﬁrm who owns the trains, and the TOC,
the ﬁrm who runs them, enshrined in the ban of long term agreements for
the supply of the rolling stocks. We translate this legal requirement into the
assumption that s is chosen separately by the ROSCO, which does so with
the aim to maximise its own proﬁt. If instead the TOC and the ROSCO
were allowed to negotiate s, then they would choose it to maximise their joint
proﬁt, and so their choice of s would be identical to that made by continental
Europe style integrated company.16 We refer to the UK regulatory regime
as the “vertical separation” regime, and to the joint negotiation of s as the
“vertical integration” regime.
2.2 Bargaining
The ROSCO can be involved in three bargaining situations. We model them
all as generalised Nash bargaining, with exogenously given bargaining power
coeﬃcient β for the ROSCO. In this model, the values agreed upon in the
bargaining process are those which maximise the weighted sum of the log of the
parties’ surplus, with weights β for the ROSCO and (1 − β) for its counterpart
(the well known details are spelled out in Appendix 1).
The ﬁrst bargaining situation for the ROSCO is its negotiation with the
TOC over the lease contract for the provision of the rolling stock and, in the
vertical integration regime, also over the speciﬁcity of the rolling stock. We
assume that the lease price negotiated by the TOC and the ROSCO is a two-
part tariﬀ (p,F),w h e r eF is a ﬁxed fee, and p is the unit price of the train
services actually leased. p is only paid if the TOC’s franchise is renewed, and
varies with demand. In our set-up, choosing p and F is equivalent to choosing
e, the quality-enhancing eﬀort by the TOC, and therefore our assumption
of bargaining over a two part tariﬀ corresponds to bargaining over e.A s a
consequence, for a given degree of train speciﬁcity, the eﬀort for service quality
chosen by the TOC always maximizes the joint proﬁt generated by the TOC
and ROSCO relationship irrespective of whether they are vertically integrated
16Whether the two companies are integrated or legally separated entities is not relevant to
the choice of the train design: if the companies are legally separated they will also negotiate a
side payment, which depends on the relative bargaining power of the two parties, and aﬀects
the distribution, but not the size, of the total proﬁt.
8or separated.17 To determine the generalised bargaining solution it is necessary
to know the “disagreement payoﬀ”of the two parties, which in the model is
their outside option. The TOC’s is 0: in the event of disagreement between the
TOC and the ROSCO, the TOC loses the franchise, which is reassigned to an
alternative TOC. We label the latter “ATOC”, an acronym reminiscent of the
actual Association of TOCs. On the other hand, the ROSCO’s outside option
is in general strictly positive because it can lease the rolling stock to the ATOC
following a broken down negotiation; it is also endogenously determined.
The second bargaining situation in which the ROSCO can be involved
is the negotiation with the ATOC over the rolling stock to be used in the
franchise under consideration. This can happen for two reasons: either because
the TOC and the ROSCO do not reach an agreement in their negotiation or
because the TOC loses its franchise due to its service quality falling short of
the minimum standard set by the regulator. In the ﬁrst case, the ROSCO and
the ATOC bargain on a lease contract for the provision of the rolling stock and,
in the vertical integration regime, on the speciﬁcity the rolling stock. In the
second case, the ROSCO and the ATOC bargain only on the lease contract
even in the vertical integration regime, since the train speciﬁcity has been
irreversibly set in the previous agreement between the ROSCO and the TOC.
In both situations, the bargaining between the ROSCO and the ATOC takes
place after the ATOC has already set its investment in eﬀort for quality and
after the quality uncertainty has been resolved, but before the resolution of
the uncertainty in demand. In other words, in both situations the regulator
reassigns the franchise to an “average” ATOC which has already passed the
quality control in another area of the network. Bargaining on a linear price is
not distortionary, since the eﬀort for quality is given, and both parties have
zero outside options, as a disagreement would lead to the cancellation of the
service.18
The ROSCO’s third possible bargaining situation is triggered by the ad-
17This modelling strategy is justiﬁed since information asymmetries between the TOC
and the ROSCO regarding e are probably not fundamental (one presumes that this was the
underlying assumption on which the separation imposed by the UK legislator is based), and
the aim of the paper is to concentrate on the comparison between the regulatory regimes,
not on the role of information asymmetries.
18That is, there can be at most one “negotiation breakdown”. The analysis would be
unaﬀected if we assumed instead that there is a (ﬁnite) sequence of potential ATOC’s with
which the ROSCO could negotiate. We would simply need to work backwards from the last
bargaining process in the sequence, adding complication but no insight.
9verse demand shock occurring in the area served by the TOC. The TOC needs
fewer trains, and the ROSCO oﬀers the surplus rolling stock to the operator
of train service in a diﬀerent area. In this case, the ROSCO and this “exter-
nal” operator bargain when all the relevant variables (the train speciﬁcity, the
“external” operator’s investment in eﬀort, and the random shocks) are ﬁxed
and known to the two parties. As before, bargaining over a unit price p is not
distortionary, and both parties have a zero outside option in this case.
The bargaining power coeﬃcient satisﬁes:
β









This guarantees that relevant second order conditions are satisﬁed. To ensure
symmetry across the network, all exogenously ﬁxed parameters are the same
in all areas of the network.
2.3 Timing
The timing of choices in multi-stage games aﬀects the outcome of the inter-
action among players. The timing is determined by constraints imposed by
the regulatory regime and by technology, and, in our set-up, the investment
required to design and build rolling stock has clearly a longer time span than
the investment in quality enhancing eﬀort, implying that the model must be
such that s is chosen before e. Demand and quality shocks have a relatively
short term nature and therefore can be posited to occur after s and e have
been set. The parties operate in a ﬁxed regulatory regime, that is, they know
that the regulator’s rules and guidelines regarding the link between the mini-
mum quality standard and the likelihood of sanctions being imposed will not
be changed as a consequence of the parties’ actions.19
These considerations lead to the following formal description of the timing
of the game.
1. Regulatory set-up. The regulator chooses whether the TOC and the
ROSCO will negotiate over the triple (s,p,F) —t h ev e r t i c a lintegration
regime —o ro v e r(p,F) only — the vertical separation regime.
19It is of course possible that the regulatory standard is unexpectedly tightened after the
parties actions, for example as a consequence of a media campaign: conceptually, this would
correspond to a negative quality shock. We restrict the range of combinations of causal
eﬀects with the assumption that the regulatory standard is not aﬀected by the choice of the
parties.
102. Minimum quality. The regulator selects qm, the minimum quality
necessary for the franchise to be continued.
3. Train speciﬁcity. The train speciﬁcity, s, is decided by the ROSCO
in the vertical separation regime, and negotiated by the TOC and the
ROSCO in the vertical integration regime.
4. Lease contract. The TOC and the ROSCO bargain over (p,F) ,t h e
terms under which the ROSCO’s rolling material can be used by the
TOC.
5. Eﬀort. The TOC decides its eﬀort for quality, e.
6. Quality uncertainty resolution. The quality shock is realised.
(a) If the realised service quality oﬀered by the TOC is at least qm,t h e
TOC retains the franchise and operates the service in the area.
(b) If the realised service quality oﬀered by the TOC is below qm, then
the TOC loses the franchise, which is reassigned to the ATOC. The
ROSCO and the ATOC bargain on the leasing price, p (because the
train speciﬁcity and ATOC’s eﬀort for quality have already been
determined in previous stages). If they reach an agreement, the
ATOC operates the service in the area, otherwise the service is
cancelled.
(c) Similarly, if the TOC and the ROSCO have failed to reach an agree-
ment in their Stage 4 negotiation, the franchise is cancelled and
reassigned to the ATOC. In this case, the ROSCO and the ATOC
negotiate over the leasing price, p, and, in the vertical integration
regime, also over the rolling stock speciﬁcity, s. Like in stage 6(b),
if they reach an agreement, then the ATOC operates the service in
the area, otherwise the service is cancelled.
7. Demand uncertainty resolution and payoﬀs. The demand shock is
realised.
(a) If the service is operated in the area under consideration, the real-
ized demand is served by the TOC (or by the ATOC), which leases
the rolling stock it needs from the ROSCO, pays the ROSCO ac-
cording to contract and collects passengers revenues.
11(b) If, due to adverse demand conditions, there are surplus trains in the
area, the ROSCO negotiates with the franchisee of a diﬀerent region.
If they agree, the ROSCO collects a share β of the unit proﬁt P (s)
times the quantity of train services transferred to the “external”
franchisee. In the case of disagreement, the unused rolling stock
remains idle, and the ROSCO makes no proﬁtf r o mi t .
3S o c i a l w e l f a r e a n d ﬁrst best
The aim of the paper is the comparison of the performance of diﬀerent regimes
against the yardstick of industry social welfare, measured by the sum of the
expected consumers’ and producers’ surplus. In this section, we characterise
t h eb e n c h m a r kg i v e nb yt h eﬁrst best social optimum. We consider a repre-
sentative area of the network, and invoke symmetry to extend our ﬁndings to
the rest of the industry.
The producers’ surplus is the proﬁt which can be obtained from a non-
speciﬁct r a i n ,viz at r a i nw i t hs =0 , r − c0 + cee, augmented by the ex-
pected cost saving due to the train speciﬁcity to the area under consideration,
(1 − α)css, and reduced by the expected extra cost due to the train speciﬁcity
when the train is used in a diﬀerent area, α1
2ks2. We assume that the con-
sumers’ surplus depends only on the ﬁnal service quality, q, not on the train
speciﬁcity s. We choose again a convenient functional form and let consumers’









b ∈ (0,1] and σ > 0 measure the concavity of the consumers’ welfare func-
tion, and the intensity of consumers’ preference for quality. σ could also be
interpreted as the importance of consumers’ surplus relative to proﬁt. The
restriction b ∈ (0,1] ensures that consumers’ surplus increases with q in its
range, the interval [0,2]. Recalling that q = e + θ and θ is uniformly distrib-
uted on [0,1], we can write the consumers’ surplus as a function of e only, say
S (e):
S (e)=σ
(6 − b)+3( 4− b)e − 3be2
12
.
The expected social welfare, W (e,s),i sg i v e nb y :








12The ﬁr s tb e s tb e n c h m a r ki st h ec h o i c eo fi n v e s t m e n ti nq u a l i t y ,e, and of train






4σ − 4ce − σb
2σb
. (10)
F r o m( 9 )w ec a ns e et h a tt h eﬁrst best degree of train speciﬁcity, s∗,i n -
creases with its eﬀectiveness in reducing the operating costs on the “right
line”, cs, and the expected quantity of train services to be employed on that
line, (1 − α), and decreases with the importance of the extra costs for using
the rolling stock on “wrong lines”, k, and the expected quantity of train ser-
vices to be moved to those lines, α. On the other hand, (10) shows that the
optimal level of the investment in quality, e∗, increases with the intensity of
consumers’ preference for quality (or, in the alternative interpretation, with
the importance of consumers’ surplus relative to proﬁt), σ, while it decreases
with the sensitivity of the operating costs to the eﬀort for quality, ce, and the
concavity of the consumers’ welfare function, b.
Graphically, the social welfare function (8) generates in the (s,e)-plane a
map of elliptic iso-welfare curves centred at the ﬁrst-best point (s∗,e ∗),a s
illustrated below in Figure 1.
4 Industry equilibrium
Keeping (9) and (10) as benchmarks, we can now characterise the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game constructed in Section 2 for a representative
franchise, working backward from the last decision stage. By symmetry, since
all franchises are alike, it constitutes the industry equilibrium.
4.1 Expected proﬁts (stage 6)
Under both vertical regimes, if the game reaches stage 6(b) or stage 6(c), if,
that is, the TOC’s franchise is not renewed because of an adverse quality shock
or because negotiations fail, then the ROSCO negotiate with ATOC a lease
price p for the use of the rolling stock available. Since both parties have zero
outside option, and since the price does not aﬀect any subsequent decision, the
bargained price will distribute the joint proﬁt, (r − c0 − ceeA + css),w h i c hi s
ﬁxed, according to the bargaining power coeﬃcients, β and (1 − β).B e f o r e
13the resolution of demand uncertainty, the expected quantity of train services
to be employed on the line equals (1 − α). Therefore, the ROSCO’s expected
proﬁt from leasing the rolling stock to the ATOC is:
(1 − α)β (r − c0 − ceeA + css).
If the TOC loses the franchise because its service quality falls short the
minimum standard, stage 6(b), then the train speciﬁcity is ﬁxed in both vertical
regimes, and the revenues generated by the use of the rolling stock outside the
area are unrelated to the outcome of the negotiation between the ROSCO and
the ATOC. In the vertical separation regime, the same is true when the game
reaches stage 6(c), that is when the TOC loses its franchise because of a lack
of agreement with the ROSCO at stage 4. In all these cases, the ROSCO’s
expected proﬁt from reaching an agreement with the ATOC is:
π
OS
R =( 1− α)β (r − c0 − ceeA + css)+αβP(s), (11)
where s is the rolling stock speciﬁcity set at stage 3, and αβP(s) is the
ROSCO’s expected proﬁt from leasing the expected quantity α of unused
rolling stock to an external franchisee. π
OS
R in (11) is therefore the ROSCO’s
outside option in the negotiation with TOC under vertical separation.
On the other hand, if the TOC and the ROSCO do not reach an agreement
in the vertical integration regime, in stage 6(c) the ROSCO and the ATOC
bargain over both prices and the train speciﬁcity. The bargained value of s in
this case maximises the expected joint proﬁt of the ROSCO and the ATOC,
(1 − α)(r − c0 − ceeA + css)+βαP(s), and the ROSCO would keep a share β
of this maximized proﬁt. Its payoﬀ would therefore be:
π
OI
R =( 1− α)β (r − c0 − ceeA + css)+β2αP(s). (12)
Analogously to (11), (12) is the ROSCO’s outside option in the initial negoti-
ation with the TOC under the vertical integration regime.20
We can now write the expected proﬁts of the TOC, ΠT,a n dt h eR O S C O ,
ΠR, following an agreement in their negotiations (stages 3 and 4) and after
20As shown below, in the vertical integration equilibrium, the TOC and the ROSCO agree
on the rolling stock speciﬁcity that maximizes their expected joint proﬁt (given by equation
(15) below). Therefore, the outside option π
OI
R does not aﬀect the equilibrium values of the
rolling stock speciﬁcity and the service quality: it will aﬀect only the division of the expected
joint proﬁt between the two parties.
14the TOC’s choice of the eﬀort for quality (stage 5), but before the resolution
of quality uncertainty (stage 6) and of demand uncertainty (stage 7):
ΠT =( 1− α)(1− qm + e)(r − c0 − cee + css − p) − F, (13)
ΠR =( 1− α)[(1− qm + e)p+ (14)
+( qm − e)β (r − c0 − ceeA + css)] + αβP(s)+F,
where P(s) is obtained from (4) and (6) as (r − c0 − ceeA) − 1
2ks2.
In (13), the expected quantity of train services employed on the line,
(1 − α), and the probability that the TOC’s retains the franchise, (1−qm+e),
multiply the diﬀerence between total revenue, r, and total costs. The latter
is the sum of production costs, c0 + cee − css, and the unit price paid for the
lease of the rolling stock, p. In addition, the TOC pays the ﬁxed fee F to
the ROSCO. This appears with a positive sign in the ROSCO’s proﬁt, (14).
In addition to it, the ROSCO’s payoﬀ is the weighted average, with weights
α and 1 − α, of (i) the ROSCO’s expected revenues per unit of train service
operated on the line: with probability (1 − qm + e), the TOC operates the
service and the ROSCO collects revenue p; with probability (qm − e),o nt h e
contrary, the ATOC operates the service and the ROSCO collects revenue
β (r − c0 − ceeA + css); and (ii) the ROSCO’s expected proﬁtf r o ml e a s i n gi t s
unused trains to an “external” franchisee, as discussed in Section 2.2.
(13) and (14) give the expected joint proﬁt generated by the TOC and
ROSCO relationship, ΠJ ≡ ΠT + ΠR:
ΠJ =( 1− α)[(1− qm + e)(r − c0 − cee + css)+ (15)
(qm − e)β (r − c0 − ceeA + css)] + αβP(s).
4.2 Eﬀort for service quality (stage 5)
At stage 5, the TOC takes the train speciﬁcity and the terms of the leasing
contract determined in (13) as ﬁxed, and chooses e to maximise ΠT.T h eﬁrst
order condition ∂ΠT
∂e =0is:
(r − c0 − cee + css − p) − (1 − qm + e)ce =0 .
Hence the TOC’s proﬁt maximising eﬀort choice is:21
e5 =
r − c0 + css − p − ce (1 − qm)
2ce
, (16)
provided this is in [0,1].
21The second order condition for an interior solution requires −2ce < 0,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed.
154.3 Lease contract (stage 4)
(15) and (16) appear to suggest that the unit price p aﬀects the Stage 5 choice
of e by the TOC, and therefore, on top of its redistributive eﬀect, it also exerts
a distortionary eﬀect. However, as we show in Appendix 1, this distortionary
eﬀect disappears when the parties negotiate over the ﬁxed fee F,a st h e yd o
here. To see this intuitively, let ΠO
R denote the ROSCO’s outside option in
the case of disagreement.22 Irrespective of how the rolling stock speciﬁcity s is
chosen, the two parties set their contractual terms, (p,F),i ns u c haw a yt h a t







The ﬁxed fee F distributes the surplus generated by the relationship, ΠJ −ΠO
R,
according to the bargaining power coeﬃcients β and 1 − β:
ΠR = ΠO
R + β(ΠJ − ΠO
R), (18)
ΠT =( 1− β)(ΠJ − ΠO
R). (19)
From (16), ∂e5
∂p = −(2ce)−1 < 0, and, from the ﬁrst order condition of
the TOC’s optimisation problem at stage 5, ∂ΠT
∂e =0 . Hence, condition (17)
reduces to ∂ΠR
∂e =0 , where ΠR is given in (14). This leads to:
p4 = β (r − c0 − ceeA + css). (20)
From equations (16) and (20) we can now derive the equilibrium level of
the eﬀort for quality, as a function of the rolling stock speciﬁcity:23
e4 =
(1 − β)(r − c0 + css)+βceeA − ce (1 − qm)
2ce
. (21)
In the symmetric equilibrium of the industry, the rolling stock speciﬁcity
and the eﬀort for quality are the same in all areas of the network, so that
eA = e4, and (21) gives the following expression for the equilibrium level of the
eﬀort for quality, b e, as a function of the equilibrium level of the rolling stock
speciﬁcity, b s (b e and b s are common to all franchises):
22As shown above, the ROSCO’s outside option in the negotiation with the TOC depends
on the vertical regime: it is given by equation (11) under vertical separation and by equation
(12) under vertical integration. This diﬀerence is, however, immaterial for our argument
here.
23In alternative, solving in e the condition
∂ΠJ
∂e =0 , and using the solution in system with
(16), would lead the same expressions for e4 and p4 as in equations (21) and (20), respectively.
16b e =
(1 − β)(r − c0 + csb s) − ce (1 − qm)
ce(2 − β)
. (22)
4.4 Choice of speciﬁcity (stage 3)
In the vertical integration regime, the rolling stock speciﬁcity is part of the
negotiation between the TOC and the ROSCO.24 In equilibrium, the TOC
and the ROSCO agree on the level of speciﬁcity which maximises their joint
proﬁt ΠJ, given in (15) (details are in Appendix 1). The ﬁrst order condition
∂ΠJ
∂s =0yields:25




In the vertical separation regime, the rolling stock speciﬁcity, s, is unilat-
erally set by the ROSCO, to maximize its expected proﬁt which would follow
an agreement with the TOC:
max
s ΠR = Π
OS
R + β(ΠJ − Π
OS
R ), (24)
where ΠJ and Π
OS
R are given by equations (15) and (11), respectively (see again
Appendix 1). Notice that the ROSCO’s outside option, Π
OS
R , itself depends
on the rolling stock speciﬁcity.26 Using (15) and (11), the ﬁrst order condition
∂ΠR
∂s =0yields:




We have assumed that costs are linear and parameters are constrained to
lie within an interval. This is an approximation of the observation that, in
24Note that, while s and (p,F) are chosen in separate stages, under the vertical regime, the
“decision maker” is the same in the two stages, and sequential or simultaneous solution yield
t h es a m eo u t c o m e . F o r m a l l y ,l e tM (s,p,F) be the joint payoﬀ function of the TOC and







∂F =0 . In sequential decision making the parties take s as




∂F =0 .T h i s g i v e s p and F as
functions of s,s a y˜ p(s) and ˜ F (s). In the previous stage, they set s,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n t



















25The second order condition for an interior solution is satisﬁed by (7).
26Since Π
OS
R does not depend on e and
∂ΠJ
∂e =0 , any indirect eﬀect of s on ΠR via e
vanishes in the ﬁrst order condition
∂ΠR








2 > 0, which is implied by (7)
17practice, costs raise progressively more rapidly as one variable moves towards
more extreme values, and simpliﬁes the analysis conveniently. The price paid
for this simpliﬁcation is the need to consider many corner cases at stage 3, since,
for some values of the parameters, the equilibrium values of some variables are
at an end point of the interval.
Proceeding with the analysis, consider ﬁrst the case s ∈ (0,1).T oc o m p a c t














β for the integration regime
1 for the separation regime
.
δ is a parameter characterising the vertical regime. The following values of the
variables characterise a “fully interior equilibrium” — an equilibrium where s,
e and z (the probability that TOC’s franchise is continued, given in (3)) all lie
in the interior of their respective range — and are obtained by solving the ﬁrst
order conditions (23) and (25) to determine the equilibrium values of s,a n d
then substituting in (22) and (3) to obtain e and z:
ˆ s =
(1 − β)
2 [R +( 1− qm)] + δ (2 − β)
δ (2 − β)K − C (1 − β)
2 , (27)
ˆ e =
δ (1 − β)(RK + C) − (1 − qm)[δK − C (1 − β)
2]
δ (2 − β)K − C (1 − β)
2 , (28)
ˆ z =
δ (1 − β)[K(1 − qm)+RK + C]
δ (2 − β)K − C (1 − β)
2 . (29)
If the equilibrium is not characterised by the ﬁrst order conditions, it is given by
values of the choice variables at the boundary of the choice set. The equilibrium
set is fully described in Lemma 1. Let:
Γ = δ (1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C] − [δK − C (1 − β)
2]. (30)
Lemma 1 There exist threshold values, qz
1,qe
1,qe
0 ∈ (0,2), such that:
i) If Γ > 0:
qm ∈ [0,1] implies e = qm s =
1+δ−β
δK and z =1 ,
qm ∈ [1,2] implies e =1 s =
δ+(1−β)(2−qm)
δK and z =2− qm.
18ii) If 0 > Γ > −(1 − β)δK:
qm ∈ [0,qz
1] implies e = qm s =
1+δ−β
δK and z =1 ,
qm ∈ [qz
1,qe
1] implies e =ˆ es =ˆ s and z =ˆ z,
qm ∈ [qe
1,2] implies e =1 s =
δ+(1−β)(2−qm)
δK and z =2− qm.
iii) If −(1 − β)δK > Γ:
qm ∈ [0,qe
0] implies e =0 s =
δ+(1−β)(1−qm)
δK and z =1− qm,
qm ∈ [qe
0,qe
1] implies e =ˆ es =ˆ s and z =ˆ z,
qm ∈ [qe
1,2] implies e =1 s =
δ+(1−β)(2−qm)
δK and z =2− qm.
Moreover, the threshold values are given by:
qz
1 =1+
δ (1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C] − [δK − C (1 − β)
2]




δ (1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C]




δ (1 − β)(RK + C)
δK − C (1 − β)
2 . (33)
The gloriously tedious proof is in Appendix 2. Lemma 1 describes how
the equilibrium changes according to the value of the quality standard qm.I n
particular, for low standard, that is if qm ≤ qz
1, the TOC’s franchise is renewed
with probability 1, to the point that, for qm ≤ qe
0 the equilibrium level of the
eﬀort for quality becomes 0. Conversely, this eﬀo r ti sa ti t sm a x i m u mv a l u e ,
e =1for qm high enough, that is when qm ≥ qe
1.
5 Optimal regulation
When the regulator cannot directly choose the ﬁr s tb e s tv a l u e so ft h er o l l i n g
stock speciﬁcity and the eﬀort for service quality, she needs to inﬂuence them
indirectly by setting the minimum quality standard, qm. The regulator takes as
given the vertical regime — separation or integration — and chooses the quality
standard that maximises the social welfare function (8) under the constraint
that the values of the rolling stock speciﬁcity and the eﬀort for quality be the
equilibrium values for that regime.
We begin the analysis of the regulator’s policy by showing that, in both
vertical regimes, she faces a trade-oﬀ between speciﬁcity and eﬀort for quality.
19Deﬁnition 1 The regulation possibility locus is the locus of points in the
(s,e)-plane representing the combinations of eﬀort for quality and rolling stock
speciﬁcity achievable through the regulation of the minimum quality standard.
While the regulator’s choice of qm can aﬀect the interaction between TOC
and ROSCO, and their choice of e and s, only combinations (s,e) on the
regulation possibility locus can be induced by the choice of qm.T h e s e a r e
described in next result.
Proposition 1 In both vertical regimes, the regulation possibility locus is non-
increasing, and it is strictly decreasing when the equilibrium values of s, e and
z all lie in the interior of their respective ranges.
Proof. For all cases where the equilibrium is not “fully interior”, Lemma 1 shows
that, as qm increases, either the eﬀort for quality increases while the rolling stock
speciﬁcity remains constant, or the rolling stock speciﬁcity decreases while the eﬀort
for quality remains constant. Consider now fully interior equilibria. Solving (27) for
qm and substituting in (28), yields:












that is, the relation between b e and b s is linear. Next, according to Lemma 1, a fully
interior equilibrium requires Γ < 0, which clearly implies δK−C (1 − β)
2 > 0.T h e r e -
fore, (34) is a downward sloping line in the (s,e)-plane. Finally, it is clear from (27)
and (28) that an increase in qm corresponds to a movement along this line where b s
falls and b e rises.
Figure 1 illustrates two possible shapes of the regulation possibility loci in
the separation regime (the solid line) and in the integration regime (the dotted
line). The LHS diagram illustrates the second part of Lemma 1. For low values
of qm, TOC’s franchise is renewed with probability 1,a n dt h el o c ia r ev e r t i c a l :
as qm increases, e increases but s remains constant. For intermediate values of
qm, the equilibrium is fully interior, and the loci take the shape of a downward
sloping line. For high values of qm,t h ee ﬀort for quality is at its maximum
possible level and the rolling stock speciﬁcity and the probability that TOC
renews its franchise both decrease with qm: the loci become horizontal on the
e =1line. The picture illustrating the ﬁr s tp a r to fL e m m a1i sd i ﬀerent from
the diagram on the LHS only in that the downward sloping portion of the curve
is vertical. The RHS diagram depicts the third part of Lemma 1. When qm is


















Figure 1: The iso-welfare loci and the regulation possibility loci.
s still in the interior of their respective ranges, and the loci exhibit a horizontal
portion on the e-axis. For intermediate values of qm, the equilibrium is “fully
interior” and the two loci are downward sloping. For high values of qm,t h e
eﬀort for quality is ﬁxed at its maximum possible level: this is the horizontal
portion of the two loci at e =1 .
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the following. As the regulator raises
the quality standard, the probability that TOC’s franchise is renewed de-
creases, even though the TOC partly oﬀset the higher quality threshold with
its eﬀort for quality. This reduces the private expected return of speciﬁcity
in both regimes. This is because whoever chooses the level of s (the ROSCO
on its own or the TOC and the ROSCO in concert) has a lower marginal
return from speciﬁcity if the ATOC rather than the TOC operates the ser-
vice. Under vertical integration, the reason is that the cost saving due to more
speciﬁcity is fully internalized in the TOC and ROSCO joint proﬁt when the
TOC operates the service, while a share (1 − β) is captured by the ATOC if
the TOC’s franchise is not renewed. Under vertical separation, the ROSCO
has a positive outside option in the negot i a t i o nw i t ht h eT O Cw h i c hi n c r e a s e s
with the rolling stock speciﬁcity. Therefore, an increase in speciﬁcity raises
t h eR O S C O ’ ss h a r eo ft h ej o i n tp r o ﬁtr e a l i s e dw i t ht h eT O C .
Our next result shows that, irrespective of the vertical regime, the industry
21equilibrium always exhibits over-investment in rolling stock speciﬁcity unless
the regulator sets qm at its maximum value, qm =2 , in which case that TOC’s
franchise is renewed with probability 0.
Proposition 2 Let 0 <
cs(1−α)
kα < 1 and β < 1. Then, in both vertical regimes,
qm < 2 implies b s>s ∗.
Proof. Using the notation introduced in (26), we ﬁrst rewrite the ﬁrst order
conditions (23) and (25) as:




where b z is the equilibrium probability that TOC’s franchise is continued. Since
αk
(1−α)cs = 1
s∗ (see equation (9)), we have:








which ensures that, in both regimes, there is over-investment in speciﬁcity unless β =1
or b z =0 . Finally, by Lemma 1, b z =0if and only if qm =2 .
The ﬁrst condition in the statement ensures that the ﬁrst-best socially
optimal level of rolling stock speciﬁcity is interior, 0 <s ∗ < 1, and the second
that the ROSCO does not have full bargaining power.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 1. All possible cases formalised in
Lemma 1 generate second-best loci with the qualitative characteristic depicted
in the ﬁgure: the dotted line is (weakly) to the right of the solid line, and both
are to the right of the ﬁrst best (s∗,e ∗): irrespective of the vertical regime, to
a c h i e v ea n yv a l u eo fe<1, the regulator must accept over-investment in speci-
ﬁcity. Only by setting qm =2the regulator can eliminate the over-investment
in s, and implement the ﬁrst-best socially optimal level of speciﬁcity, with the
resulting value of e at its maximum possible level.
In a word, Proposition 2 says that there is over-investment in speciﬁcity. To
understand why this happens, recall that speciﬁcity oﬀers the social beneﬁto f
lowering the cost of operating the rolling stock on the network it was designed
for, at the social cost of additional operating costs if the train is moved to a
diﬀerent network. The private choice of s would replicate the ﬁrst-best socially
optimal choice only when the social cost and the social beneﬁt of speciﬁcity
are internalised in the proﬁt function of the private decision maker exactly
in the same proportion. This is clearly the case when the ROSCO has full
22bargaining power, in which case the social cost and beneﬁt of speciﬁcity are
fully internalised in the ROSCO’s proﬁt in both vertical regimes. If instead
the ROSCO does not have full bargaining power, if, that is, β < 1, then only
as h a r eβ of the social cost of speciﬁcity is internalised in the proﬁt function
of the decision maker for the choice of s,t h er e m a i n i n g1 − β share is borne
by an ATOC operating the service in a diﬀerent network. On the beneﬁt
side, if the TOC’s franchise is not renewed (z =0 ), then the TOC and the
ROSCO (in the integration regime) or the ROSCO alone (in the separation
regime) collect the fraction β of the proﬁt generated by the ATOC on the
“right” network, and thus the share β of the social beneﬁt of speciﬁcity: the
social cost and beneﬁto fs p e c i ﬁcity are internalised in the same proportion by
the private decision maker, and the private choice of s is socially optimal. If,
on the contrary, z>0, then, irrespective of the vertical regime, the private
decision maker of s internalises (in expectation) a share of the social beneﬁt
of speciﬁcity larger than β:27 the private decision maker of s internalises a
higher proportion of the social beneﬁt than of the social cost of speciﬁcity,
which leads to over-investment in speciﬁcity in both regimes.
We are now in the position to analyze the regulator’s optimal choice of the
vertical regime.
Proposition 3 If the ﬁrst-best social optimum is interior in both s and e,t h e
vertical separation regime is strictly socially preferable to the vertical integra-
tion regime.
The “interior” condition implies that the centre point of the ellipses drawn
in the picture is not on the sides of the [0,1]×[0,1] square in the (s,e)-plane.
The regulator selects the minimum quality standard to obtain the combi-
nation of e and s given by the point of tangency of the separation locus and
the highest possible iso-welfare curve. As the Figure illustrates, the reason
why the vertical separation regime (solid line) is preferable is that it limits
the over-investment in speciﬁcity. While the intuition is easily illustrated, the
formal proof is more complex, and can be found in Appendix 2. Notice also
that, irrespective of the shape of the regulation possibility loci, the regulator’s
27As argued in the discussion of Proposition 1, the private marginal return of speciﬁcity
is always higher when the TOC rather than the ATOC operates the service on the “right”
network, and it equals the fraction β of social marginal beneﬁt when the ATOC operates the
service.
23preferred value of e is 1 only when the ﬁrst best is also 1. In this case, the op-
timal regulation policy achieves the ﬁrst-best levels of both s and e by setting
qm =2in both regimes.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is straightforward given our discussion of
Propositions 1 and 2. The over-investment in speciﬁcity is always stronger
under vertical integration: if the TOC operates the service on the “right line”,
the social beneﬁt of speciﬁcity is fully appropriated by the ROSCO and the
TOC in the vertical integration regime, whilst only a fraction of it is appro-
priated by the ROSCO in the vertical separation regime. On the other hand,
as we have already explained, in both regimes whoever sets s internalises the
fraction β of the social beneﬁt of speciﬁcity when the ATOC operate the ser-
vice on the “right line”, and the fraction β of the social cost of speciﬁcity in
all circumstances.
In the second-best solution, there is always over-investment in speciﬁcity
(unless the regulator can achieve the ﬁrst-best), while the level of the eﬀort for
quality can be greater or equal to the ﬁrst-best value. This is shown in Figure
1. If the tangency point between the separation locus and the lowest possible
iso-welfare curve is on a downward sloping (respectively, vertical) portion of
the locus — as on the RHS (respectively, LHS) —, then the second best is a fully
interior equilibrium and there is (respectively, there is no) over-investment also
in eﬀort for quality. Notice also that the regulation of the quality standard,
linked to the threat of franchise termination, is an eﬀective way to ﬁne tune the
eﬀort for quality, which can take any value in [0,1], and the regulator adjusts
the investment in eﬀort for quality with the aim to reduce the over-investment
in speciﬁcity.28
28We have so far assumed that the equilibrium level of speciﬁcity is interior: b s ∈ (0,1).
This is not restrictive. We have already shown that b s ≥ s
∗, and therefore the second best
optimum, b s,c a nb e0 only when the ﬁrst best, s
∗,i sa l s o0, that is when speciﬁcity has no
social value. This is not realistic for the railway industry. b s<1 is not restrictive either,
provided the ﬁrst best level, s
∗,i sa l s ol o w e rt h a n1.A l l o w i n gf o rb s =1simply means that our
second best loci now can reach the line where s =1 , and partially coincide with it. However,
for all other portions of the loci, our comparative results would still apply. This means that
the integration locus will never lie below the separation locus, and the second best solution
under integration never dominates the second best solution under separation. More precisely,
the two regimes would oﬀe rt h es a m es o c i a lv a l u e :( i )f o re
∗ =1(as shown in our second-best
analysis), since the over-investment in speciﬁcity can be completely eliminated without any
cost in term of over-investment in eﬀort; (ii) for suﬃciently low values of e
∗, since, for these
low values of e, both regimes would oﬀer the same level of speciﬁcity, the upper bound s =1 .
In all other cases (i.e., for intermediate values of e
∗) vertical separation dominates vertical
246 Concluding remarks.
This paper examines the eﬀects of imposing separation on the vertically related
suppliers of the outputs necessary in a regulated industry. The stylised model
is inspired by the structure of the UK railway industry, where TOCs and
ROSCOs, the suppliers of train services and of rolling stock are obliged to
maintain a substantial degree of separation from each other. This is unlike
most of the rest of the world, where instead the suppliers of train services also
own the trains used to supply those services. It can shed light on several other
regulated industries, where it is technologically feasible to separate the vertical
stages of production, in some cases, such as British Gas, imposed as a remedy
to non-competitive practices.
Our paper conﬁrms the view that the UK system provides a weaker in-
centive to speciﬁct r a i nd e s i g na n de ﬀort for quality than a more vertically
integrated system. However, unlike the existing literature (see footnote 10
above), we show that the beneﬁt of a competitive and ﬂexible structure, both
ex-ante and ex-post, may well outweigh the negative eﬀects of lower speci-
ﬁcity and the lower quality eﬀort that occur in the separation regime, as also
suggested by Aﬀuso and Newbery (2002).
In the competitive environment which characterises the UK railways, speci-
ﬁcity is set partly with the aim of reducing the probability that the franchise
is lost by the Train Operating Company: a high speciﬁc i t ym a k e si tl e s sc o s t l y
for the TOC to meet the quality standard set by the regulator. To the extent
that the ROSCO can extract some of the surplus from the TOC being abler
to comply with the quality standard, the ROSCO can gain by increasing the
rolling stock speciﬁcity even though it will mean lower revenues in the event
that trains need to be switched to a diﬀerent area. And here lies the diﬀerence
between the two vertical regimes. In the integration regime, the ROSCO can
extract more of the TOC’s surplus, because it can do so in the direct negoti-
ation. In the separation regime, it must instead do it indirectly, by adjusting
s itself, which aﬀects the ROSCO’s outside option in the negotiation with the
TOC over the lease contract. The surplus it can extract is smaller, and hence
t h ed o w n s i d eo fs p e c i ﬁcity (the lower revenues in the case speciﬁct r a i n sn e e d
to be switched to a diﬀerent line) keeps its level down in the separation regime.
integration for the same reasons illustrated in this Section. Finally, the case where s
∗ =1
is a limit case where the two regimes are always equivalent. This shows that the regime of
integration is weakly dominated by the regime of vertical separation.
25In other words, train speciﬁcity is used by the TOC (possibly in concert
with the ROSCO) to blunt the regulatory threat of the withdrawal of the
franchise (by making it cheaper for the TOC to meet the service quality stan-
dard). This over-investment in speciﬁcity is greater in the integration regime,
because the TOC and the ROSCO are better able to agree on this strategic
use of s, and it disappears when it is not possible to aﬀect the probability
that the TOC’s franchise is continued, that is when, although the equilibrium
probability that the franchise is renewed is 0, the eﬀort for quality is already at
its maximum value. On the other hand, the equilibrium probability that the
TOC’s franchise is continued can be 1 only if the TOC adjusts the eﬀort for
quality one-to-one to any increase in the quality standard. The cost savings
from more speciﬁcity play a crucial role in incentivising the TOC to follow this
strategy. This explain why, in both regimes, the over-investment in speciﬁcity
is maximum when z =1 .
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Appendix 1.
In this appendix, we ﬁrst show that the generalized Nash bargaining between the
ROSCO and the TOC over the two part pricing schedule (p,F) leads, as claimed in
the text, to the choice of the joint proﬁt maximising level of eﬀort for quality and
to the division of the resulting surplus, ΠJ − ΠO
R, according to the bargaining power
coeﬃcients β and (1 − β). Subsequently, we show that the rolling stock speciﬁcity
bargained by the TOC and ROSCO in the vertical integration regime maximizes their
joint proﬁt.










T ,( A 1 . 1 )
where ΠR and ΠT are given by equations (14) and (13), respectively, and ΠO
R is the
ROSCO’s outside option in the negotiation with TOC. For the moment, we do not
need to distinguish between the values of the ROSCO’s outside option in the two
vertical regimes, but only to note that the ROSCO’s outside option is independent of
































































=0 .( A 1 . 3 )
Now, from equations (14) and (13), we calculate dΠR
dF = −dΠT
dF =1 ,w h i c hm e a n s
that F has a pure distributive role with no eﬀect on the joint proﬁt. Hence (A1.2)
reduces to






The joint proﬁti sΠJ = ΠT +ΠR, and so (A1.4) gives the distribution of the surplus
























=0 .( A 1 . 5 )
O b v i o u s l y ,t h ep u r ed i s t r i b u t i v ee ﬀect of the unit-price p on the TOC’s and the
ROSCO’s proﬁts cancels out in the joint proﬁt. Therefore, ΠJ depends on p only







which is (17) in the text.
Consider now the vertical integration regime. The ROSCO and TOC bargain over











T ,( A 1 . 6 )
where the ROSCO’s outside option, Π
OI
R , is given by (12). Notice that, beside being
independent of the pricing schedule, Π
OI
R is also independent of the rolling stock
speciﬁcity under negotiation between the ROSCO and the TOC, since, in the case of
disagreement, the rolling stock speciﬁcity will remain indeterminate and will enter the
successive negotiation between the ROSCO and the ATOC. In addition to (A1.2) and


















In other words, the TOC and the ROSCO agree on the speciﬁcity level that maximizes
their joint proﬁt.
Appendix 2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .P a r t( i). We ﬁrst prove that if Γ > 0,( Γ is given in (30)), then
there cannot be a fully interior equilibria for any qm ∈ [0,2]. To this end, reformulate
equation (28) as:
b e =1+
δ(1 − β)((R − 1)K + C) − (δK − C (1 − β)
2) − (1 − qm)(δK − C (1 − β)
2)




δ (1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C] > 0( since R>1 and C>0), (A2.2)
β (2 − β)K − C (1 − β)
2 > 0( for b s to be positive and ﬁnite). (A2.3)
2If Γ > 0, b e<1 would require (δK − C (1 − β)
2) > 0 and qm < 1, as it is apparent
from (A2.1). On the other hand, (31) would imply qz
1 > 1.S i n c eb z is decreasing in
qm (see (29)), b z is corner at 1 for qm ≤ qz
1. With qz
1 > 1, b z will be corner at 1 for
any qm ≤ 1. Then, over the [0,2] range of qm, the the equilibrium is either corner in
e (for qm ∈ (1,2]), or corner in z (for 0 ≤ qm ∈ [0,1)), or corner in both e and z (for
qm =1 ), and we never ﬁnd a fully interior equilibrium.
To characterise the equilibrium, we ﬁrst re-write the ﬁrst order conditions in s of
the two regimes (equations (23) and (25)) in the compact form:
δ +( 1− β)z = δKs. (A2.4)
For qm ∈ [0,1],z=1 , so that z =1− qm + e implies e = qm. The equilibrium
level of s must solve condition (A2.4) with z =1 , yielding: s =
1+δ−β
δK .
For qm ∈ [1,2],e=1so that z =1− qm + e implies z =2− qm. The equilibrium
level of s must solve condition (A2.4) with z =2− qm, yielding: s =
δ+(1−β)(2−qm)
δK .
Parts (ii)a n d( iii). We ﬁrst prove that, if Γ < 0, then there exist a sub-interval
of [0,2] such that if qm is in that sub-interval, then the industry equilibrium is fully
interior.
Notice that, Γ < 0 and (A2.2) imply δK − C (1 − β)
2 > 0. Then, from (A2.1), b e
is increasing in qm.
Next, Γ < 0 implies 1 <q e
1 < 2 (from (32)) and 0 <q e
0 < 1 (from (33)). This
ensures that b e takes interior values for values of qm in a connected sub-interval of
[0,2] containing 1. On the other hand, Γ < 0 implies qz
1 < 1 (from (31)). Since b z
is decreasing in qm and cannot be zero for 0 < b e<1 (as explained in footnote 28,
p.19), b z also takes interior values in a (connected) interval of qm around 1. There must
therefore exist a connected interval of qm around 1 where both b z and b e are interior.
Since b s is interior by assumption, the equilibrium is fully interior in this interval.
The upper extreme of values of qm such that the equilibrium is fully interior is
always qe
1. Therefore, for qm ∈ [qe
1,2],e=1 , and the equilibrium is characterised as in
the analogous case of part (i): e =1 ,z=2− qm,a n ds =
δ+(1−β)(2−qm)
δK (third line
of both part (ii) and part (iii)).
The lower extreme of the fully interior equilibrium interval is clearly given by the
maximum between qz
1 and qe
0. Using equations (31) and (33), we ﬁnd that qz
1 >q e
0 is
equivalent to Γ > −(1 − β)δK.
In part (ii), Γ > −(1 − β)δK, so that the fully interior equilibrium arises for
qm ∈ [qz
1,qe
1] (second line of part (ii)).
For qm ∈ [0,qz
1],z=1 , and the equilibrium is characterised as in the analogous
case of part (i): z =1 ,e= qm,a n ds =
1+δ−β
δK (ﬁrst line of part (ii))
In part (iii), Γ < −(1 − β)δK, so that the fully interior equilibrium arises for
qm ∈ [qe
0,qe
1] (second line of part (iii)).
3For qm ∈ [0,qe
0],e=0 , so that z =1−qm+e implies z =1−qm. The equilibrium
level of s must solve condition (A2.4) with z =1− qm, yielding: s =
δ+(1−β)(1−qm)
δK
(ﬁrst line of part (iii)). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . The essence of the proof is showing that each of the
possible pairs (one for the integration and one for the separation regime) of regulation
possibility loci has the property that the locus for the separation regime always lies
on the left of the locus for the integration regime for every 0 ≤ e<1.I n v i e w o f
Proposition 2, this implies that the separation regime entails less over-investment in
speciﬁcity for any value of the eﬀort for quality (except the maximum) the regulator
might want to implement by setting the minimum quality standard. Building upon
proposition 1 (over-investment in speciﬁcity in both regimes), it is suﬃcient to show
that in any parameter region of the model, by moving qm, the regulator can implement
a lower (or, at least, not higher) level of speciﬁcity in the separation rather than in
the integration regime for any level of eﬀort for quality she would like to achieve.
According to Lemma 1, we can have three alternative shapes for the second best
(s,e)−locus of each regime (made explicit in our discussion of proposition 1). Hence,
abstracting from the consistency of the parameter conditions, we can in principle
combine the integration and the separation loci in nine diﬀerent ways. We proceed
by distinguishing two classes of cases. In the ﬁrst class, the separation locus has a
downward sloping portion (corresponding to fully interior equilibria), as in the two
diagrams of Figure 1, while the integration locus can either have a downward sloping
portion (like in the two diagrams of Figure 1) or be inverted-L shaped (i.e., the shape
arising from the ﬁrst part of Lemma 1). This class comprises six of the nine possible
cases.
We show that, in all cases of this class, the separation locus always lies on the left
of the integration locus (except for e =1 , where the two loci overlap). Assume ﬁrst
that also the integration locus has a downward sloping portion. Then, using equation
(34) with δ =1for the separation and δ = β for the integration regime, it is easy
to check that the linear downward sloping portion is ﬂatter under integration (recall
that β < 1) and intersects the line e =1for a higher value of s. Then, irrespective of
the shape of the remaining portions of the two loci (i.e., a vertical segment, as in the
right diagram of Figure 1, or an horizontal segment lying on the e =0−line,a si nt h e








where the left (right) hand side of the inequality is the measure of the segment 0b
(resp., 0a) in the diagrams of Figure 1 (by Lemma 1). This inequality is indeed
always satisﬁed for β < 1.
There are two other possible cases in the ﬁrst class: the integration locus is inverted
L-shaped, while the separation locus can either be as in the left or as in the right
4diagram of Figure 1. If so, the inequality above is clearly suﬃcient for the separation
locus always being on the left of the integration locus.
The second class consists of the three cases where the separation locus is always
inverted-L shaped, and the integration locus has, alternatively, an inverted L-shape,
the shape shown in the left or in the right diagram of Figure 1. If both loci are
inverted L-shaped, the inequality above is again suﬃcient to prove the statement. The
remaining two cases could, in principle, invalidate the statement. In these cases, the
separation locus is inverted L-shaped, that is, the level of s is ﬁxed at
2−β
K for any e<1.
The integration locus, on the contrary, always exhibits a downward sloping portion
(corresponding to fully interior equilibria). We prove, however, that the parameter
condition for a fully interior equilibrium in the integration regime is inconsistent with
the parameter condition required for the separation locus to be inverted L-shaped, so
that these cases are impossible. From parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1, a fully interior
equilibrium in the integration regime requires:
β (1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C] − [βK − C (1 − β)
2] < 0.
On the other hand, the separation locus is inverted L-shaped only if the condition of
part (i) of Lemma 1 holds when δ =1 , that is:
(1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C] − [K − C (1 − β)
2] ≥ 0.
Hence, it should be:
(1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C] − K +




(1 − β)[(R − 1)K + C] − K + C (1 − β)
2 > 0,
which is impossible since
C(1−β)2
β >C(1 − β)
2 as β < 1. ¥
5